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BUT COULD THEY PRAY AT UVA?
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF THE
SUPREME COURT'S SCHOOL PRAYER JURISPRUDENCE
TO THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE'S ADULT CADETS
Alexander A. Minard*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari for a Fourth Circuit case involving
a rather rare school prayer situation - school prayer at an institution of higher
learning.' The Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a state-run military school in
Lexington, Virginia, had a tradition of praying prior to their communal dinner each
night. The Fourth Circuit upheld a district court opinion striking down the prayer
as unconstitutional because it violated the Establishment Clause.2
The response to the Fourth Circuit's ruling was far-reaching, playing out in the
newspapers and even in Congress. The Virginia Attorney General immediately
vowed to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, which he did.3 The super-
intendent of VMI, General Josiah Bunting, wrote an editorial in the Wall Street
Journal, arguing for the benefits of the prayer and criticizing the district court for
ignoring crucial facts.4 One of the dissenting judges wrote an editorial in the
Richmond Times-Dispatch after rehearing was denied, arguing that the Fourth
Circuit's ruling went too far, and that the prayer is "the most benign form of
* Alexander Minard is a JD candidate at the College of William & Mary School of Law.
He graduated from Kenyon College with a bachelor of arts in political science. He wishes
to thank his parents and Maureen Salmon for their advice and encouragement.
m Bunting v. Mellen, 124 S. Ct. 1750 (2004) (denying certiorari because the dispute was
insufficient and there was a lack of a direct circuit split), denying cert. to 327 F.3d 355
(4th Cir. 2003). Justice Stevens wrote the opinion denying certiorari, joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer; Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 124 S. Ct.
at 1751.
2 Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir.), reh'g denied en banc, 341 F.3d 312 (4th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1750 (2004). The Fourth Circuit split six-six on its vote
for rehearing, and so the motion was denied. Mellen, 341 F.3d at 312.
3 Mellen, 327 F.3d 355,petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3421 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2003)
(No. 03-863); see Jerry Markon, Federal Court Upholds Ban on VMl Prayers, WASH. POST,
Aug. 14, 2003, at B5.
' Josiah Bunting III, Houses of Worship: Grace UnderFire, WALLST. J., Feb. 15, 2002,
at WI 1.
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religious observance."5 Walter B. Jones, Jr., a Republican representative from North
Carolina and a member of the House Armed Services Committee, even introduced
a bill that would protect the United States Naval Academy, which has a similar
prayer, from the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Mellen.6
Over the past fifty-five years, the Supreme Court has heard several cases
involving school prayer situations at elementary and secondary schools. The juris-
prudence is not entirely consistent; over time, the Court has employed at least
three different tests.7 However, there is no controlling jurisprudence regarding
school prayer at public colleges or universities. As the Fourth Circuit noted, "the
[United States Supreme] Court has never directly addressed whether the
Establishment Clause forbids state-sponsored prayer at a public college or
university." 8 Perhaps that is partly because of the rarity of such situations, but also
perhaps it is a situation which the Supreme Court has been unwilling to wade into.
In 1997, both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits upheld prayer at graduation ceremonies
of public universities.9 The Supreme Court likewise denied certiorari in both of
those cases."
School prayer at public colleges and universities presents an interesting nexus
to review the Court's jurisprudence in the area. The Supreme Court has been
fairly consistent in striking down school prayer at elementary and secondary schools,
or at least in limiting the policies to very specific circumstances." Fear of the
coercive nature of communal prayer at public schools is the common justification
that seems to run throughout many of its decisions. In other words, the Court has
' J. Harvie Wilkinson, We Should Be Slow To Discount the Sustaining Role of Faith,
RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 31, 2003, at E3. The judge concluded: "There is, however, a
balance to be struck between enforcing the vital dictates of the Establishment Clause and the
need not to visit hostility upon religious observance in all its forms." Id.
6 Ariel Sabar, GOP Bill Backs Meal Prayers; Move Is Replying to Ruling Against
VMI's Supper Grace; Sponsor's 'Concern Is Annapolis'; ACLU Has Criticized Naval
Academy's Ritual, BALT. SUN, Oct. 13, 2003, at B1. Within a month of introducing the bill,
Representative Jones gathered twenty-three co-sponsors. Id.
7 See infra Part I.
8 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 366.
9 Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that offering non-
sectarian prayers or moments of silence at a university function did not violate the
Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1024 (1998); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d
982 (7th Cir.) (holding that giving non-sectarian invocation and benediction at a public
university graduation ceremony was permissible under Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992), and did not violate the Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 814
(1997).
t0 Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 523 U.S. 1024 (1998), denying cert. to 130 F.3d 232 (6th
Cir. 1997); Tanford v. Brand, 522 U.S. 814 (1997), denying cert. to 104 F.3d 982 (7th
Cir. 1997).
" See infra Part I.
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been primarily worried that students at elementary and secondary schools are
minors in a position of relative powerlessness and high impressionability. 12 Yet,
students at public colleges and universities are presumptively not minors, nor are
they passive subjects. Marsh v. Chambers3 is the only Supreme Court decision
regarding a similar policy where the participants (both willing and unwilling)
were not minors. There, the Court upheld the Nebraska legislature's practice of
opening sessions with a prayer. 4 At a public college or university, would the
Court be worried about "coercing" adults into praying? Would the Court be more
willing to allow adults to exercise their religious rights freely? Would the Court
ignore any "coercion" concerns and strictly rule on establishment grounds?
The Court's current jurisprudence is extremely unhelpful prospectively. Not
only has the Court employed several different tests, seemingly choosing on a
whim which to apply, but each test demands an intensive review of the specific
facts of each case, followed by rather tenuous conclusions. Indeed, although the
Fourth Circuit seemed to think that VMI's prayer obviously violated the
Constitution, it granted that General Bunting could reasonably have believed other-
wise.' 5 In an area so fraught with disagreement, shouldn't the guiding precedent
be more clear?
This Note argues that school prayer at public institutions of higher learning
should be unconstitutional, even without the coercive element (because of the
non-minor status of students). Any prayer implemented by a government actor
should be held to violate the Establishment Clause. This does not mean that the
government must be openly hostile to religion. The First Amendment includes two
clauses pertaining to religion: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause.16 When it is the government that acts, a religious practice is "established."
Whether the government allows religious acts to occur is in the purview of the Free
Exercise Clause. VMI's supper prayer is the former.
This Note analyzes prior Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding school
prayer and its application to prayer at public colleges and universities. Part I
reviews the history of school prayer cases in the Supreme Court, starting in
1947 with Everson v. Board of Education,7 and the respective tests and reasoning
12 See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
'3 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
14 Id. at 792.
"5 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 376. In fact, General Bunting continues to believe otherwise. In
his Richmond Times-Dispatch editorial, he wrote, "the court has profoundly misunderstood
VMI's purposes and, more important, has profoundly misjudged the intellectual indepen-
dence of VMI's cadets." Bunting, supra note 4.
16 The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'7 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that New Jersey's spending of tax-raised funds to pay the
bus fares of parochial school students as part of a general program, under which it paid the
2005]
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used in each successive case. Part II addresses the Mellen case specifically, paying
particular attention to the unique nature of VMI and the Court's prior treatment of
the Institute in United States v. Virginia.8 Finally, Part III offers recommendations
for how the Supreme Court should resolve the law in terms of school prayer at
public colleges and universities. Despite the Court's procedural dodging of the
issue at the heart of the dispute,' 9 it is likely that school prayer, even at insti-
tutions of higher learning, will be an issue that American courts will face again.
Current jurisprudence provides little or no consistent guidance, and there prob-
ably will be a case in the future that the Supreme Court cannot avoid deciding
because of procedural gamesmanship. A moment of silence, for example, would be
appropriate in situations in which people decide that an event requires solemnity.
Participants would be allowed to exercise freely their religious or areligious
preferences."
fares of students attending both public and other schools, was not prohibited by the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause).
IS 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that VMI's admission policy excluding women violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
'9 Justice Stevens denied certiorari because "there no longer is a live controversy between
Bunting and respondents regarding the constitutionality of the prayer." Mellen, 124 S. Ct. at
1751.
20 Although it relied on a questionable reading of Lemon in doing so, the Fourth Circuit
recently upheld minute-of-silence legislation in Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir.)
(holding that Virginia's statute mandating the establishment of a "minute of silence" in state
public schools satisfied the three prongs of the Lemon test because it had a legitimate secular
purpose, neither advanced nor hindered religion, and the state had not become excessively
entangled with religion), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 996 (2001). The Fourth Circuit distinguished
the Virginia statute from the Alabama moment-of-silence statute previously held unconsti-
tutional by the Supreme Court in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding that the
statute had no secular purpose based on legislative history). The Fourth Circuit noted that the
factual record before it in Brown was markedly different from that in Wallace, because there
was no evidence that Virginia was acting "in open defiance of federal constitutional law,"
as Alabama had clearly done. Brown, 258 F.3d at 280. Indeed, in Wallace, the Court implied
that a minute-of-silence with a secular purpose could be constitutional. Wallace, 472 U.S.
at 59 (noting that a legislative intent to "protect[] every student's right to engage in voluntary
prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the schoolday" was constitutionally
unobjectionable); see also id. at 66 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[Tihe 'effect' of a straight-
forward moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to 'advanc[e] or inhibi[t] religion.' Nor would
such a statute 'foster an excessive government entanglement with religion."' (quoting Bd.
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,243 (1968), and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13
(1971) (citation omitted) (alteration in original)); id. at 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Even
if a statute specifies that a student may choose to pray silently during a quiet moment, the
State has not thereby encouraged prayer over other specified alternatives."). Finally, unlike
in Alabama, Virginia teachers were not actively leading their students in chants and prayers.
Brown, 258 F.3d at 281.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION
JURISPRUDENCE AS IT RELATES TO SCHOOLS
In 1947, the Supreme Court heard Everson v. Board of Education.2" New Jersey
enacted a statute in 1941 authorizing "its local school districts to make rules and
contracts for the transportation of children to and from schools."22 The defendant
Board of Education "authorized reimbursement to parents of money expended by
them for the bus transportation of their children on regular busses operated by the
public transportation system. 23 Parents of students who attended Catholic parochial
schools were included in the program. The Court laid out the meaning of the
Establishment Clause at length:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance
or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa.24
The Court went on to analyze the New Jersey statute in light of the above definition
of the Establishment Clause. It wrote: "[W]e must be careful, in protecting the
citizens of New Jersey against state-established churches, to be sure that we do not
inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to
all its citizens without regard to their religious belief."2 The Court did not follow
a rigorous review of the policy, nor did it apply a formulaic test. Rather, it held
merely that the statute did not violate the Establishment Clause, primarily because
it applied equally to both students of public schools and students of parochial
schools. In conclusion, the Court stated, "The First Amendment has erected a wall
21 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
22 Id. at 3.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 15-16. The Court prefaced this description by stating that the Establishment
Clause meant "at least" that number of restrictions; therefore, the list should be understood
as a "floor" and not exhaustive. Id. at 15.
21 Id. at 16.
1001
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between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could
not approve the slightest breach. 26
It was not until 1962 that the Supreme Court heard another important
Establishment Clause case involving schools. In Engel v. Vitale,2 7 the Court over-
turned a New York state program requiring daily classroom invocation of God's
blessing as prescribed in the Regent's prayer.2" The Court held that "it is no part of
the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the
American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by govern-
ment., 29  Furthermore, the Court stated that the prayer's violation of the
Establishment Clause could not be cured by the fact that "the Regent's prayer is
'non-denominational' and the fact that the program, as modified and approved by
state courts, does not require all pupils to recite the prayer but permits those who
wish to do so to remain silent or be excused from the room."3 It is interesting to
note that, in a footnote, the Court distinguished the recitation of the Regent's prayer
from the "officially encouraged" recitation of "historical documents such as the
Declaration of Independence which contain references to the Deity or by singing
officially espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith in a
Supreme Being.""
21 Id. at 18. Interestingly, the "wall of separation" concept has crept into many people's
understanding of the First Amendment. However, the language comes not from any official
legislative history of the amendment, but rather from a political constituent letter Thomas
Jefferson wrote as President to the Danbury Baptist Association in Connecticut in 1802.
Jefferson wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his
faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach
actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence
that act of the whole American people which declared that their
legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall
of separation between Church and State.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1,
1802), reprinted in MICHAEL W. McCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION
54-55 (2002) (emphasis added). Of course, the phrase may have been coined first by Roger
Williams, founder of the colony of Rhode Island. See id. at 41.
27 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
28 Id. at 424-25. The State Board of Regents composed the following prayer, which it
directed to be said aloud by each class at the beginning of the day: "Almighty God, we
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our
teachers and our Country." Id. at 422.
29 Id. at 425.
30 Id. at 430.
31 Id. at 435 n.21. This distinction is interesting on two levels. First, the Court finds a
difference between the two practices of officially encouraged prayer and officially
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The following year, the Court heard two companion cases involving
Pennsylvania and Maryland state requirements that schools begin each day with a
Bible reading.32 Without laying out a standardized test, which the Court would do
in later cases, it held that schools could not sponsor any type of prayer because states
could not "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another."33 The Court came down strongly on the side of the Establishment
Clause in both of these cases, in part due to the school's explicit adoption of
Christian prayer. It claimed that it was not sacrificing the freedoms of the Free
Exercise Clause at the expense of the Establishment Clause. The Court stated, "we
cannot accept that the concept of neutrality, which does not permit a State to
require a religious exercise even with the consent of the majority of those affected,
encouraged patriotic recitations, even though both include references to God. Recently, the
Court relied on procedural issues to dodge the ultimate issue of whether the phrase "Under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance was constitutional. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). After the Ninth Circuit held that the phrase was unconsti-
tutional, there was an immediate and significant backlash against the decision. See Scott
Gold, An Angry Chorus Vows to Keep God in the Pledge, L.A. TIMES, June 28,2002, at Al;
Charles Lane, U.S. Court Votes to Bar Pledge of Allegiance: Use of 'God' Called
Unconstitutional, WASH. POST, June 27, 2002, at Al. The Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the Ninth Circuit because Mr. Newdow, who sued on behalf of his (then)
kindergarten-aged daughter who was subjected to the teacher-led recitation, "lack[ed] the
right to litigate as her next friend" as her mother enjoyed exclusive legal custody. Newdow,
124 S. Ct. at 2311; see also id. at 2307. The Court concluded: "When hard questions of
domestic relations are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court
to stay its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional
law." Id. at 2312. Three Justices concurred in the judgment, but each criticized the Court for
sidestepping the ultimate issue. See id. at 2312 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 2321
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2327 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thus, the phrase is
curiously left untouched, for now.
Second, the language the Court uses to refer to "the Deity" and "a Supreme Being,"
seems to be deferential to the concepts. Engel, 370 U.S. at 435 n.21 (emphasis added). In
only this passing footnote, the Court ducks the issue of whether such related professions of
belief in God are likewise unconstitutional. Id.
32 Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The Pennsylvania
law required: "At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the
opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such
Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or
guardian." Id. at 205. As practiced at Abington Senior High School, the Bible reading was
broadcast over an intercom into each room and was followed by the recitation of the Lord's
Prayer, where students stood and said the prayer in unison. Id. at 207. The Maryland rule
"provided for the holding of opening exercises in the schools of [Baltimore], consisting
primarily of the 'reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of
the Lord's Prayer."' Id. at 211.
" Id. at 216.
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collides with the majority's right to free exercise of religion."'  Later cases would
become more difficult, as school policies adapted to the Court's jurisprudence and
became less explicitly Christian, or even, in some cases, less explicitly about
reciting a prayer.
The first case in which the Court enunciated a discernible test for determining
whether a state's policy was excessively entangled with religion did not involve a
school prayer.3 1 Instead, the test arose out of state aid to church-related elementary
and secondary schools. The Court laid out a three-prong test by combining the
reasoning of some of its prior Establishment Clause cases. As stated by the Court,
the test was the following: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.' ' 36 In a remarkable retreat from its earlier strict
separationist stance, the Court noted that "total separation [between church and
state) is not possible in an absolute sense."37 It continued: "Judicial caveats against
entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is
a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a
particular relationship."3 The Court then embarked on a detailed, fact-specific
analysis of the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes, finally holding that they
were indeed unconstitutional.39
" Id. at 225-26. Again, it is interesting to note a passing comment made by the Court in
a footnote:
We are not of course presented with and therefore do not pass upon a
situation such as military service, where the Government regulates the
temporal and geographic environment of individuals to point that,
unless it permits voluntary religious services to be conducted with the
use of government facilities, military personnel would be unable to
engage in the practice of their faiths.
Id. at 226 n.10. VMI is, of course, a military school, but one run by the state of Virginia.
However, each cadet has volunteered to attend the Institute and, moreover, the supper prayer
at issue in Mellen does not concern the voluntary use of state facilities.
" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
statutes providing state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools were
unconstitutional). It was the three-prong test laid out in Lemon that the Fourth Circuit relied
on in overturning VMI's supper prayer. See Mellen, 327 F.3d at 370-71.
36 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,674 (1970))
(citation omitted).
17 Id. at 614.
38 id.
" Id. at 607-11.
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Next, in County ofAllegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,° the Court
adopted a test laid out originally by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in
Lynch v. Donnelly.4' Neither Lynch nor Allegheny involved school prayer, but both
did involve the display of religious symbols by a city during the Christmas and
Hanukkah holiday season. Only five years apart, the Court came to opposite con-
clusions in these cases, particularly in regards to the display of the nativity scene.
Justice O'Connor expressed in her Lynch concurrence, "I write separately to
suggest a clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine. The suggested ap-
proach leads to the same result in this case as that taken by the Court, and the
Court's opinion, as I read it, is consistent with my analysis. 42 She went on further:
"It has never been entirely clear, however, how the three parts of the [Lemon] test
relate to the principles enshrined in the Establishment Clause. Focusing on insti-
tutional entanglement and on endorsement or disapproval of religion clarifies the
Lemon test as an analytical device." 3 In applying her test, she looked to both the
purpose and the effect of the government's act." As for the purpose, she wrote that
the "proper inquiry" is "whether the government intends to convey a message of
endorsement or disapproval of religion.45 She then turned to the effect of the act;
in so doing, she noted that it does not "require invalidation of a government practice
merely because it in fact causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition
of religion." 46 Finally, although she wrote that "[g]overnment practices that purport
to celebrate or acknowledge events with religious significance must be subjected to
careful judicial scrutiny, ''47 she found that the city did not violate the Establishment
Clause through its display of a creche, because it neither "intended to endorse" nor
"had the effect of endorsing Christianity."48
Four years later, in Allegheny,49 the Court adopted Justice O'Connor's endorse-
ment test. In a similar situation - a city displaying a nativity scene during the
Christmas season - the Court nonetheless came to the opposite holding of Lynch.0
- 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that the city's display of a creche outside city and county
buildings violated the Establishment Clause, but that the display of a Hanukkah menorah
next to a Christmas tree did not unconstitutionally endorse the Christian and Jewish faiths).
41 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that the city did not violate the Establishment Clause by
displaying a nativity scene in its Christmas display, notwithstanding the religious sig-
nificance of the nativity scene); id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 688-89.
44 Id. at 690.
" Id. at 691 (emphasis added).
46 Id. at 691-92.
47 Id. at 694.
48 id.
49 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595-97 (1989).
'o Id. at 601-02.
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However, there was a distinguishing fact: in Allegheny, the nativity scene
included an angel holding a banner that read, "Gloria in Excelsis Deo!" 1 After a
detailed description of the decorations, Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court,
outlined the Court's test: "In recent years, we have paid particularly close
attention to whether the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or
effect of 'endorsing' religion, a concern that has long had a place in our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 52  Subtly noting the Court's shift to the
endorsement test, he wrote:
Whether the key word is "endorsement," "favoritism," or
"promotion," the essential principle remains the same. The
Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government
from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief
or from "making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to
a person's standing in the political community.
53
The third test established by the Court came in an actual school prayer case. A
public school student sought an injunction to prevent invocations and benedictions
at the graduation ceremonies of schools in Providence, Rhode Island.54 The Court
declined to reconsider its decision in Lemon, stating that the case at bar was so
straightforward as not to require the Court to reconsider "the general constitutional
framework by which public schools' efforts to accommodate religion are
measured."55 However, the Court did highlight a new factor for deciding these
cases, despite its claims to the contrary. It elevated what was before only mentioned
in passing to be the determinative factor in school prayer cases.56 The Court stated
that "there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from
subtle coercive pressures in the elementary and secondary public schools."'
It is, we concede, a brief exercise during which the individual
can concentrate on joining its message, meditate on her own
5' Id. at 580. Translated from Latin, the phrase means, "Glory to God in the Highest!"
52 Id. at 592.
" Id. at 593-94 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
5 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (holding that the policy of the city of
Providence was unconstitutional because "[t]he government involvement with religious
activity.., is pervasive, to the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious
exercise in a public school").
55 Id.
56 See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at 430-31; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 307 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 261-62 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
" Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
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religion, or let her mind wander. But the embarrassment and the
intrusion of the religious exercise cannot be refuted by arguing
that these prayers, and similar ones to be said in the future, are
of a de minimis character. 8
It is interesting to note that the Court refused to "address whether that choice [of
whether to participate or protest] is acceptable if the affected citizens are mature
adults, but we think the State may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause,
place primary and secondary school children in this position."5 9  The deter-
minative factor, then, is the coercive effect of the practice on the minor student at
a public school, rather than any of the factors laid out in the Court's prior
jurisprudence.
When the Fourth Circuit decided Mellen v. Bunting, it had no less than three
tests from which to choose, none of which had been explicitly overruled or rejected
by the Supreme Court.' Facing a novel policy - prayer by adult students - the
Fourth Circuit had little guidance from the nation's highest court on which test
to apply.
II. THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE AND MELLEN V. BUNTING
A. A Brief Description of VMI and the Supper Roll Call
The Virginia Military Institute was founded in 1839 in Lexington, Virginia.
Citizens of Lexington, a young lawyer named John Thomas Lewis Preston in
particular, decided that the military post should be converted into a military college
in order to bring some discipline to the soldiers living there.61 The plan was
approved by Virginia's General Assembly, and thus was born what is now one of
only two state-run military colleges in the country.
5 Id. at 594.
'9 Id. at 593.
6' A fourth case, and the most recent, did not introduce a new test, but merely addressed
a subtle shift in school prayer policies. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290
(2000) (holding that a school district policy allowing student-led, student initiated prayers
before high school football games was facially unconstitutional because it was impermissibly
coercive). The Court essentially treated the case as a refinement of Lee.
61 See 1 COLONEL WILLIAM COUPER, ONE HUNDRED YEARS AT V.M.I. 14-36 (1939)
(quoting Preston's own account of the Insitute's creation); see also HENRY A. WISE,
DRAWING OUT THE MAN: THE VMI STORY (1978).
62 COUPER, supra note 61, at 29; see also A Brief History, at http://www.vmi.edu/
show.asp?durki=1792 (last visited Jan. 17, 2005). The Institute was shelled and burned
during the Civil War in June 1864, but reopened in October of the following year. Since its
founding, alumni have fought in every war involving the United States. Id. The Citadel in
South Carolina is the only other state-run military college in the United States. See The
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The Institute has been at the center of controversy before; in 1996, the Supreme
Court ruled that VMI was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause because it did
not accept women. 63 While it is a military-style school, it is state-run: "The Virginia
General Assembly, not the Department of Defense, controls VMI."'' Its students are
required to enroll in one of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs,
but graduates are not necessarily commissioned in the United States military. The
mission of the school is,
to produce educated and honorable men, prepared for the varied
work of civil life, imbued with love of learning, confident in the
functions and attitudes of leadership, possessing a high sense of
public service, advocates of the American democracy and free
enterprise system, and ready as citizen-soldiers to defend their
country in time of national peril.6'
To that end, "VMI utilizes an adversative method of training, modeled on an English
educational philosophy and once characteristic of military instruction. The adver-
sative method features physical rigor, mental stress, equality of treatment, little
privacy, minute regulation of personal behavior, and inculcation of certain values."66
The Fourth Circuit's factual findings of the methods by which VMI trains its
students, particularly in their first year when they are known as "rats," was deter-
minative in later holding the Institute's supper prayer to be unconstitutional. "In
preparing its cadets for military leadership, VMI seeks to teach self-control, self-
discipline, and the subordination of personal desires to the greater good. The
adversative method involves a rigorous and punishing system of indoctrination."67
The district court judge in United States v. Virginia68 found that "[t]he VMI expe-
rience is predicated on the importance of creating doubt about previous beliefs and
experiences in order to create a mindset conducive to the values VMI attempts to
Citadel: Profile, at http://www.citadel.edu/r3/about/profile/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 24,
2005). Norwich University, founded in 1834 in Vermont, is a private military school. WISE,
supra note 61, at 13.
63 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). The Fourth Circuit in Mellen relied
heavily on the factual conclusions of United States v. Virginia. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 361, 371.
6 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 375-76 n.13.
65 MISSION STUDY COMMITTEE OFTHE VMIBOARD OFVISITORS REPORT (May 15, 1986),
quoted in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 521-22.
' Mellen, 327 F.3d at 361.
67 Id.
68 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991).
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impart."69 The Fourth Circuit referred to "submission and conformity" as "central
tenets of VMI's educational philosophy," which is a "program of indoctrination. 7 °
Henry A. Wise, in his 1978 book about the history of the Institute, offers a
different perception of VMI's teaching methodology. In a passage that pre-dates
even VMI's resistance to co-education, Wise defends VMI's uniqueness:
The most ardent supporters of the VMI way do not now, nor did
they in more tranquil times, claim that it is for every young man.
And it is relevant in this context to point out that those who
associate with VMI men would be quick to say that they,
whether cadets or alumni, are highly individualistic persons -
anything but automatons.7'
Wise's characterization seems in line with those who have attended VMI and those
who defend the school. The factual findings about VMI's teaching methods by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia, and the Fourth Circuit's reliance on
them, seem to demean the cadets and the proud tradition of VMI.
VMI previously had a similar meal-time prayer, but discontinued it in 1990
when the school switched to cafeteria-style dining.72 When General Bunting became
superintendent in 1995, he reinstated "a traditional [Supper Roll Call] formation and
family-style dining, including the supper prayer," every day except Saturday, in an
effort "to bring a stronger sense of unity to the Corps."73
Room and board at VMI, which are required, cover the cost of all meals.
Although "[c]adets (other than rats) do not technically have to eat in the mess hall,"
there are few other options.74 Following the lead of the Supreme Court in reviewing
religion cases, the Fourth Circuit engaged in an extensive description of the
69 Id. at 1421.
70 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 361.
71 WISE, supra note 61, at 4.
72 It is unclear at what point VMI first instituted the supper prayer. Some trace it back to
the 1950s. See Chris Kahn, VMI Alumni Upset About Prayer Ruling, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRES, Jan. 25, 2002. Others claim the cadets recited the prayer on and off since the
school's founding in 1893. See Ariel Sabar, Court Case CouldAffect Naval Academy Prayer:
VMI Cadets Challenge Required Meal Grace, BALT. SUN, Mar. 30, 2002, at 1A. In a
footnote, the district court mentions that the prayer may have been abandoned in 1972, in
response to the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1076 (1972), which held that the federal military service academies' mandatory
chapel requirement was unconstitutional. VMI voluntarily ended its own chapel requirement
after Anderson. See Mellen, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 622 n.2.
" Mellen, 327 F.3d at 362 n.5. For a description of the SRC, see infra notes 68-74 and
accompanying text.
14 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 361-62 n.3.
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circumstances surrounding VMI's supper prayer. The Fourth Circuit described
VMI's supper as follows:
The first seating begins with the "supper roll call" (the
"SRC"), initiated by a bugle call summoning the Corps into
formation in front of the Barracks. After an accountability
report, the colors are struck, and the Corps marches in review
past the TAC Officer (the VMI faculty member in charge) to the
mess hall. First classmen (cadets in their final year) are
authorized to fall out of the SRC formation before the Corps
marches to the mess hall. Once the formation reaches the mess
hall, other cadets, except for the rats, may fall out. The rats are
required to march into the mess hall and eat supper during the
first seating.
7
VMI altered the process somewhat after the fall of 2001, when the lawsuit was
filed.76 The court continued:
After the rats and other remaining cadets have entered the
mess hall, the Corps is called to attention, and the Regimental
Commander - the senior cadet officer - presents the Corps to
the TAC Officer.... [T]he command "REST" is given.... The
daily announcements are made, and the Cadet Chaplain then
reads the supper prayer to the assembled Corps.77
The Post Chaplain "has composed a separate supper prayer for each day. 78 And
while the prayer refers to either "God" or "Father," it does not specifically mention
"Jesus."79 In other words, it is not explicitly Christian, although it is implicitly
monotheistic. "The Corps must remain standing and silent while the supper prayer
is read, but cadets are not obliged to recite the prayer, close their eyes, or bow their
heads."" °
71 Id. at 362.
76 Id. at 362 n.4. For the purposes of the lawsuit, the district court and the Fourth Circuit
reviewed the policy that was in place at the time the lawsuit was filed. Id. This Note will also
only review the original SRC.
71 Id. at 362.
78 Id.
79 id.
so Id.
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General Bunting, in his Wall Street Journal editorial, criticized the court's
factual findings."' His description of the SRC deserves full mention, as he char-
acterizes several crucial aspects differently:
It begins with a series of bugle calls in the barracks alerting
cadets to the approaching mandatory formation. Cadets form
in their platoons, companies and battalions for roll call ....
The companies march in formation to the mess hall, to a drum
cadence, parading past the officer in charge.
Just before entering the mess, all but our new cadets may fall
out of formation and go their own way. They may enter the
mess hall later, while the meal is still being served. Those who
proceed into the mess hall are called to attention while the
senior cadet presents the corps to the officer in charge. Then
they are ordered to "rest," a position that requires them to remain
standing, but not attentive.
A brief, nonsectarian, inclusive blessing is then recited over
the loudspeaker by a cadet.... After grace, the cadets continue
with their meal.
VMI requires no participation in this grace. There is no
mandatory head bowing, hand folding, eye closing or other man-
ifestation of a prayerful attitude. In fact, cadets at rest can talk
quietly, eat, drink.., in short, disengage from the point in the
ceremony where the prayer is recited. They are merely expected
to remain standing until the ceremony is concluded.82
Thus, according to General Bunting, the SRC is not conducted in a coercive
atmosphere, but rather is just another ritualistic step in which cadets must par-
ticipate, perhaps no different from roll call or daily announcements.8 3
In response to a complaint by a student who ultimately became one of the
plaintiffs, General Bunting wrote, "[T]he Constitution does not prohibit our saying
grace before supper .... [Prayer] is a precious link to our heritage and an admirable
SI Bunting, supra note 4.
82 Id. General Bunting's description comports with alumni's description of the supper
prayer. Bob Munno, VMI '81, remembered: "It was nothing major.... Somebody would talk
over the microphone, it would be garbled and nobody could understand him anyway." Kahn,
supra note 72.
83 For a criticism of the casual treatment of what most believe should be a formal, serious
event, see Anderson, 466 F.2d at 299 (Leventhal, J., concurring) (criticizing the Naval
Academy's mandatory chapel attendance requirement as debasing religion). See also infra
note 101 and accompanying text.
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practice for a school of our provenience and culture."" Before the court, he argued
that "prayer during military ceremonies and before meals is part of the fabric of our
society, and that the drafters of the First Amendment did not intend to prohibit
prayer before meals at a military school.""5 On the other hand, the plaintiffs:
[E]mphasize[d] that the supper prayer is composed by a state
official (the VMI Post Chaplain) and that it is delivered on a
daily basis at mealtime, when the Corps is assembled as a
"family." Furthermore, the prayer is delivered as part of an
official VMI function, entirely controlled by the school.86
The plaintiffs, two third-year cadets, filed suit against General Bunting, charging
that the supper prayer violated their rights under the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment and under Virginia state law.
B. The District Court Opinion
The district court, in granting partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs,
concluded:
Because of the intense, coercive environment created by the
Institute's adversative method, under which students are
instructed to "subordinate [their] own personal desires and
well-being to the good of the whole unit," the primary effect
of this practice has been to compel students to participate in a
state-sponsored religious exercise. Finally, because the prayers
are drafted and recited at the direction of the Institute's
Superintendent, the result is that government has become im-
permissibly entangled with religion.87
Relying on a mixture of factual findings from the Supreme Court's earlier VMI case,
United States v. Virginia, and from the pleadings in Mellen, the district court found
that the adversative method was an essential aspect of the education a VMI cadet
receives."
84 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 363 (internal quotations omitted) (first alteration in origional).
85 Id. at 369 (characterizing General Bunting's argument).
86 Id.
87 Mellen, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 621 (alteration in original).
88 Id. at 622.
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In defense of the prayer, General Bunting argued that it was part of a "kugui,
non-religious ceremony known as Supper Roll Call."89 He argued also that the
prayer served "to give the cadets a chance to become alive to a spiritual dimension
in their lives .... It accommodates the faith of those who come with faith. For
others, it provides a brief moment of reflection on the importance and value of
things beyond themselves." 9 Moreover, "the prayer exposes cadets to the sorts of
religious expressions they can expect to experience in the military at a variety of
gatherings and ceremonies." 9' Finally, he asserted that the supper prayer reflected
the "American tradition of expressing thanks and seeking divine guidance," and
provided a link to the traditions of America and the Institute.92
The plaintiffs asked the court to review the prayers under the three-prong Lemon
test, while the defendant argued that the deference to history and tradition showed
in Marsh was more appropriate.93 The court rejected the defendant's assertion of
academic freedom.94 The court began its analysis by noting that "[slince 1971,
when Lemon v. Kurtzman was decided, the Lemon test has been applied to every
Establishment Clause case except for one. The lone exception is Marsh v.
Chambers."95 The court stated that the holding of Marsh was limited to "the
particular historical circumstances presented in that case. 96 Since VMI's supper
prayer did not share the "unique history" of legislative prayer, because "public
colleges and universities like VMI did not even exist at the time that the First
Amendment was drafted," the court refused to analyze the prayer under Marsh.97
The court proceeded to apply the three-pronged Lemon analysis.
The first prong of Lemon requires the practice at issue to have a secular
purpose. 98 The defendant offered three secular purposes of the prayer, all of which
the court found to be lacking. General Bunting first suggested that the "supper
19 Id. at 623.
90 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
I' ld. at 624 (internal quotations omitted).
92 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
93 id.
4 Id. The defendant argued, in the alternative of a Marsh analysis, that the court should
review the supper prayer under several academic freedom cases, rather than as a pure
Establishment Clause case. Id. The court reviewed the several cases cited by the defendant,
but found they were inapplicable to the case at bar and concluded: "Further evidence of the
inapplicability of the academic freedom cases to the present situation is Defendant's inability
to define an appropriate test to determine when, in his words, 'academic freedom concerns
are outweighed by Establishment Clause concerns."' See id. at 625-27. This issue was not
raised on appeal. Mellen, 327 F.2d 355.
" Mellen, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (citation omitted).
96 Id. at 625 (quoting N.C. ACLU v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 1148 (4th Cir. 1991)).
9' Id. at 625. See infra note 126 for criticism of relying on temporal distinctions to
support constitutional clauses.
98 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
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prayers aid the educational mission of VMI by encouraging cadets to reflect on and
develop their own spiritual dimension." 99 The court thought that the "only logical
conclusions that can be drawn from this purpose is that part of the Institute's
educational mission .. .is religious indoctrination."'" Distinguishing teaching
religion from practicing religion, the court noted that the academic purposes
advanced by General Bunting were "reminiscent" of those advanced in Anderson
v. Laird.' The court cited Judge Leventhal's concurring opinion in that case,
which quoted the response of an amicus curiae brief: the government's explanation
is "'a "shocking" claim to debase and manipulate religious worship as a mere
instructional tool.""" a The court, therefore, found that General Bunting's first
purpose failed to define the prayer as secular.
General Bunting next asserted that the prayers serve the "pedagogical and
institutional purpose of familiarizing cadets with [the tradition of prayer and
thanksgiving], including its relevance to the Founders and the principal heroes of
the nation and the Institute."' 3 The court responded that "[njo language in the
prayers refers to this history or tradition,"'" and that, moreover, the Supper Roll
Call did not constitute a ceremony that required solemnization.' 5 The court thereby
distinguished the supper prayer at VMI from the prayers in both Chaudhuri and
Tanford. °6
Finally, General Bunting offered that the prayers "accommodate[d] the spiritual
needs and free exercise rights of cadets, whose opportunities to meet those needs
and exercise those rights are limited by the demands of barracks life and the highly
structured nature of the VMI program."'17 The court dismissed this purpose because
General Bunting insisted that VMI must do more than offer the cadets the oppor-
tunity to pray and "provide some affirmative support as a means of accommodating
the religious needs of the cadets."' 108 The court stated that, because VMI was
"composing and reciting specific prayers upon which students are directed to
reflect,"'" this purpose could not be secular.
99 Mellen, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 629 (internal quotations omitted).
1oo Id.
o' Id. at 629-30. In Laird, the United States Secretary of Defense argued that "[t]he sole
purpose of chapel attendance is to develop in the cadets, through observation of the impact
of religion on the lives of others during actual worship services, that sensitivity to religious
emotion which is required of a military leader." Id. at 630 (quoting Anderson v. Laird, 466
F.2d 283, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal, J., concurring)) (alteration in original).
102 Id. (quoting Anderson, 466 F.2d at 299 (Leventhal, J., concurring)).
103 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
104 Id.
'os Id. at 631.
1I6 Id.; see also supra note 9.
'0' Mellen, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 631 (internal quotations omitted).
"' Id. at 632 (internal quotations omitted).
109 Id.
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Although the court found that VMI's supper prayer failed the first prong, it
continued its analysis. The second prong of Lemon requires that the prayer's
"principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion."".. The court found that, even assuming a secular purpose, VMI's supper
prayer would fail this prong as well."' Refusing to read the Supreme Court's
religion cases as establishing one standard for children (as minor students) and
another for adults, the court instead asserted that the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence implies that courts must review Establishment Clause challenges on a
case-by-case basis. 1 2 The court stated that "in conducting an analysis of an
Establishment Clause claim, a court must be particularly vigilant in those situations
where citizens may be subtly and indirectly coerced to participate."'H3 Again, the
court distinguished VMI's supper prayer from the prayers in Chaudhuri and
Tanford.' "' The court found that while both those circuit courts "considered the age
of the complainants, their constitutional focus was also on coercion.""..5 It con-
cluded that, while it was "permissible, and perhaps greatly beneficial, to use such
intense, coercive methods to train and prepare military and civilian leaders," it was
"unconstitutional to use these same methods to exact conformity with a state-
imposed religious practice."
'
"
6
The third and final prong of Lemon requires that the prayer "not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion.""' 7 VMI's supper prayer could
not survive this prong, either. The court concluded:
The prayers are drafted by the VMI Chaplain, and they are
read, at the direction of the Superintendent, at each night's
supper in the VMI mess hall. These prayers are recited, not just
because Defendant wishes to accommodate the religious needs
of his cadets, but because he wishes to focus the Corps' thoughts
on the particular subject embraced by the VMI prayer. Thus...
"[t]hese invocations are authorized by a government policy and
take place on government property at government-sponsored
school-related events."
'
"
18
110 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
... Melen, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 633.
I12 d. at 634.
1 Id. at 635.
114 Id. at 635-36.
115 Id. at 635.
116 Id. at 636.
"1 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (internal quotations omitted).
"1 Mellen, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (citations omitted).
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After finding that VMI' s supper prayer failed all three prongs of the Lemon test, the
court granted the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment that the prayer
violated their rights under the Establishment Clause and ordered a permanent
injunction requiring VMI to cease the prayers.1 9
C. The Fourth Circuit's Opinion
Within a year of the district court's opinion, a three-judge panel of the Fourth
Circuit heard oral arguments. 2 ' The Fourth Circuit issued a unanimous opinion
affirming in part and vacating in part the district court's ruling.12' The Fourth
Circuit began by noting that they would review, de novo, the district court's award
of summary judgment."22 The court then reviewed the relevant jurisprudence of both
the Supreme Court and of other circuits before concluding that it would "assess the
supper prayer against the principles announced in Lee and Santa Fe, and.., then
apply the Lemon criteria, treating the endorsement test as a refinement of Lemon's
second prong."'' 23 It stated, "[b]ecause the Court has applied a variety of tests (in
various combinations) in school prayer cases, federal appellate courts have also
followed an inconsistent approach."' 24 Clearly, the Fourth Circuit was unsure of
how the Supreme Court would approach the situation, and so it decided to try each
of the various tests promulgated by the Court in the hopes that it could therefore
protect itself from being overturned on appeal.
The Fourth Circuit refused to apply Marsh's reasoning12 because (1) Marsh
was limited to its specific facts (that Congress authorized legislative prayer at the
same time that it produced the Bill of Rights), and (2) public universities and
military colleges did not exist when the Bill of Rights was adopted.'26
"9 Id. at 638.
120 The panel included Judge King, Senior Judge Hamilton, and Senior Judge Greenberg
of the Third Circuit, who was sitting by designation. See Mellen, 327 F.3d 355.
12 The court affirmed the district court's decision that the plaintiffs had alleged a
violation of their constitutional rights, but held that General Bunting was entitled to
qualified immunity. See id. at 376.
122 Id. at 363.
123 Id. at 371. In so deciding, the court also rejected General Bunting's argument to apply
the Marsh analysis. Id.
124 Id. at 370.
125 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
126 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 369-70. Interestingly, Nebraska, the state whose legislative prayer
was in dispute in Marsh, was not a state when the United States Congress authorized
legislative prayer and adopted the Bill of Rights. The logic used to justify limiting Marsh to
its particular facts seems disingenuous; what if the authorization of legislative prayer had
come a week earlier, or a week later, than the production of the Bill of Rights? To say that
Congress did not intend the First Amendment to apply in the context of opening legislative
sessions with prayer, but meant it to apply to every other instance of public prayer is
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First, the court stated: "Under the Supreme Court's decisions in Lee and Santa
Fe, school officials may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, compel
students to participate in a religious activity."' 2 7 General Bunting argued that
"VMI's cadets are mature adults, who will not feel coerced to participate in the
supper prayer," and that "members of the Corps (other than rats) may avoid the
prayer by falling out of the SRC formation before the Corps enters the mess hall."'
28
The court dismissed both reasons.
The Fourth Circuit also found that Chaudhuri and Tanford could be
distinguished. It concluded that "[b]ecause of VMI's coercive atmosphere, the
Establishment Clause precludes school officials from sponsoring an official prayer,
even for mature adults.' 29 The court relied on language in Chaudhuri and Tanford
highlighting that the audience in both cases - mature adults - would not be
coerced by the prayers at issue. However, the court ignored that both decisions
relied more on the fact that the audience was composed of mature adults than
whether they were placed in a coercive environment. In other words, the Fourth
Circuit inappropriately elevated the "coercion" element of those decisions at the
expense of the "mature adults" element in order to distinguish Chaudhuri and
Tanford from Mellen.
illogical. This distinction is perhaps just a convenient way of dismissing the justification as
it applies to other practices the Court wishes to strike down. The Court has similarly written
off defenses of public prayer in regards to the Pledge of Allegiance and the fact that currency
contains the phrase "In God We Trust." See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716-17 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[These references are uniquely suited to serve such wholly secular purposes
as solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring commitment to meet some national challenge
in a manner that simply could not be fully served in our culture if government were limited
to purely nonreligious phrases."). It is only further evidence that this area of the law is in
complete disarray when Justice Brennan can write a statement like that. Furthermore, by
predicating this one exception on "history and tradition," the Court necessarily elevates
Christian practices above those of other religions; obviously, other religions do not enjoy the
same history and tradition in America. Therefore, "the Court seems more apt to secularize
practices derived from Christianity, thus preferring Christianity over other religions." Ashley
M. Bell, Comment, 'God Save This Honorable Court': How Current Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled with the Secularization of Historical Religious
Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1273, 1307 (2001). This curious opinion adds to the
inconsistency of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
127 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 371-72. Again, the court relied on the adversative method as characterized by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia. Although it refers to VMI cadets as "mature
adults," the court clearly does not treat them as such, because under VMI's adversative
teaching method cadets are subjected to "obedience and conformity" as the "central tenets
of the school's educational philosophy," and presumptively - at least under the court's
reasoning - cannot make independent decisions as a result. Id. at 37 1.
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The court also found that the "voluntariness" of the supper prayer was
insufficient to save the practice, referring to it as merely "technical."' 30 Although
"VMI's upperclass cadets could avoid the mess hall in order to shield themselves
from the prayer," the court found that "the communal dining experience" was
"undoubtedly experienced as obligatory."' 3' Finding that "the First Amendment
does not in any way prohibit VMI's cadets from praying before, during, or after
supper, the Establishment Clause prohibits VMI from sponsoring such religious
activity,"' 132 the court concluded that VMI's supper prayer cannot survive the Lee
coercion test.
When reviewing the supper prayer in terms of the second test, Lemon's three
prongs, the court found that (1) the "state-sponsored activity" had "an overtly
religious character"; 33 (2) "[t]he supper prayer has the primary effect of promoting
religion, in that it sends the unequivocal message that VMI, as an institution,
endorses the religious expressions embodied in the prayer"; u and (3) there was an
excessive government entanglement with religion because "VMI has composed,
mandated, and monitored a daily prayer for its cadets."' 35 The supper prayer was,
therefore, unconstitutional.
For the first prong, General Bunting asserted the same secular purposes before
the Fourth Circuit as before the district court. 36 The Fourth Circuit believed that
General Bunting's purposes were insufficient to overcome the religious purposes of
the prayer, worrying that he sought "to obscure the difference between educating
VMI's cadets about religion, on the one hand, and forcing them to practice it, on the
other."'37 Nevertheless, it granted him the benefit of the doubt and turned to the
second and third prongs of the Lemon test.'
For the second prong, the court held that "[t]he supper prayer has the primary
effect of promoting religion, in that it sends the unequivocal message that VMI, as
an institution, endorses the religious expressions embodied in the prayer."' 39 It
continued: "Even though VMI intended the supper prayer to be both inclusive and
nondenominational, the Establishment Clause prohibits a state from promoting
130 Id. at 372.
"' Id. One wonders how the Fourth Circuit could have removed all doubt from that
conclusion without a complete record before it to support the claim.
132 id.
'13 Id. at 373.
'3 Id. at 374.
131 Id. at 375.
136 Id. at 373. General Bunting offered three purposes. Id.; see supra Part II.B.
131 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 373.
138 id. at 374.
139 Id.
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religion by authoring and promoting prayer for its citizens."" Therefore, the supper
prayer violated the second part of Lemon, the "primary effect" prong.'
41
Despite the supper prayer failing under the second prong, the court continued
its analysis to the third prong. It found an excessive entanglement because "VMI
has composed, mandated, and monitored a daily prayer for its cadets."' 142 Therefore,
under both the Lee coercion test and the three prongs of Lemon, the Fourth Circuit
found VMI's supper prayer violative of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
D. The Fourth Circuit's Denial of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing and
Rehearing En Banc
General Bunting, as the defendant-appellant, appealed the Fourth Circuit
panel's ruling.'4 3 The vote returned was six-six and, failing to garner a majority,
General Bunting's appeal for a rehearing en banc was denied.'" Three judges filed
dissenting opinions.
Judge Widener dissented primarily because he felt the panel relied "on what it
obviously believe[d] is some kind of impure motivation on the part of VMI' 145 and
because of the several examples of "the frequent and implicitly approved use of
prayer and like religious symbolism by branches of the United States government
in situations and ceremonies similar to the VMI supper prayer. ''46
Judge Wilkinson, who would also write an editorial criticizing the opinion in
the Richmond Times-Dispatch, dissented because "[n]ot every public religious
observance is a First Amendment violation."'' 47  Rather than violating the
Establishment Clause, Judge Wilkinson wrote that "[tihe supper prayer at Virginia
Military Institute is the most benign form of religious observance. It is brief and
non-sectarian, and it takes place in a higher education setting in which the dangers
'4 Id. at 375. In a footnote, the court noted that the inclusive and nondenominational
nature of the supper prayer is insufficient because (1) it "takes a particular view of religion,
one that is monotheistic, patriarchical, and indebted to Judeo-Christian values and con-
ventions of worship," and (2) "the Establishment Clause prohibits a state from sponsoring
any type of prayer, even a nondenominational one." Id. at 374 n. 12.
141 Id. at 374.
142 Id. at 375.
"' Mellen v. Bunting, 341 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2003), denying reh'g en banc to 327 F.3d
355 (4th Cir. 2003).
'44 Id. at 313.
145 Id. (Widner, J., dissenting).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 319 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); see also Wilkinson, supra note 5 and accom-
panying text.
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of coercion are minimal." '148 Judge Wilkinson noted that the facts are critical in
all Establishment Clause challenges. 149 He argued the facts that VMI cadets are
adults, that the prayer is non-sectarian, and that the prayer takes place in a military
setting should be sufficient to uphold the practice as constitutional.
Judge Wilkinson doubted that "cadets who are deemed ready to vote, to fight
for our country, and to die for our freedoms, are so impressionable that they will be
coerced by a brief, non-sectarian supper prayer."' 50 He argued that Supreme Court
jurisprudence limits the coercion element to school-age children, and that "the
opportunities presented at VMI are altogether open; no one is forced or coerced to
attend the school, and neither are they now prohibited from doing so.''. He found
the coercive element utterly lacking because both attendance and participation were
voluntary.5 2 He concluded that none of the restrictions imposed upon cadets while
at "'rest' . . . could possibly coerce a dissenting cadet into believing that he or she
was participating in the prayer or was signaling any approval of it to others."'5 3
Second, Judge Wilkinson asserted that the secular purposes proposed by General
Bunting were not offensive because they "are not the property of any sect. And they
do not contain the slightest hint of proselytization to cadets. They are common to
all faiths or even to no faith.'
'154
Finally, Judge Wilkinson pointed to the military aspect of VMI's educational
philosophy. He concluded: "In the considered judgment of the school officials, the
supper roll call ceremony - including the religious observance - furthers VMI's
core mission by training cadets to become more complete soldiers and civilians."' 5
Judge Wilkinson cited the experience of "school officials with considerable military
backgrounds" who have determined that SRC "will best achieve VMI's mission."'56
148 Mellen, 341 F.3d at 319.
149 Id.
150 id.
151 Id. at 320.
152 Id. at 321. "The panel found that [the prayer is coercive], but in doing so the panel
speculated as to the social pressures that VMI's educational system might impose upon
cadets." Id.
153 Id. Judge Wilkinson continued, "No cadet could reasonably believe that the act of
standing, in this context, signaled assent to the prayer - all cadets must stand for altogether
secular reasons, as ordered by school officials for such things as daily announcements." Id.
154 Id. at 322. It is hard to understand how Judge Wilkinson can characterize the act of
praying to "God" as common to no faith, but he supported his position by pointing to clearly
religious acts by the federal government supported by the Supreme Court, such as legislative
prayer and imprinting "In God We Trust" on coins. Id. at 322-23.
115 Id. at 323.
156 Id. For VMI' s mission, Judge Wilkinson quoted the Supreme Court from United States
v. Virginia. VMI's mission "is to produce citizen-soldiers, men [and women] prepared for
leadership in civilian life and in military service." Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. at 520) (internal quotations omitted).
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He went on to suggest that since the panel ruled the supper prayer unconstitu-
tional, it had somehow upset the "unit cohesion and bonding [that] are necessary
ingredients of success [in fighting a war]."' 7 Judge Wilkinson seems to undermine
his own argument that the supper prayer is not coercive when he characterizes the
communal ceremony of SRC as creating bonds that will "sustain soldiers in their
darkest and most dangerous hours."' 8 If it is not coercive, how can it also create a
communal bond?
Judge Wilkinson asserted that the supper prayer satisfied the three prongs of the
Lemon test. 159 Pointing to the panel's acceptance of General Bunting's secular
purposes (which was done for the sake of argument), Judge Wilkinson claimed that
the primary purposes were permissible and that there was no excessive entanglement
because there was "no need for VMI to interact with any religious organizations."'
6
Though questionable, Judge Wilkinson's characterization of the prongs of Lemon
is reasonable, and his conclusions serve to accentuate the problems posed by the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence; the tests give judges great latitude in interpreting
individual cases.
The third dissenting judge, Judge Niemeyer, chose to dissent because the panel
extended "Supreme Court jurisprudence - which has never found unconstitu-
tional prayer in public colleges and universities - and creates a conflict with the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits.' 6' Judge Niemeyer likewise minimized the coercive
element and highlighted that the cadets were at VMI voluntarily. 162 Judge
Niemeyer concluded with a history of the Establishment Clause, arguing that the
panel opinion misinterpreted its purpose.
63
The dissenters point out many of the shortcomings of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. All of them, however, made normative arguments, at root appeal-
ing to public (i.e., Christian) sympathies by implicitly arguing that cadets should
keep quiet if they do not like the prayer. There is little legal precedent - other than
the suspect and weak Marsh opinion - to which the dissenters refer. While
explicitly arguing that VMI's supper prayer does not violate the Establishment
Clause, the dissenters ultimately show the inherent weaknesses in how the
Supreme Court has dealt with these issues in the past. There is little definitive
guidance for judges to apply the tests outside of the similar situations for which
they were created.
17 Id. at 323.
158 id.
159 Id. at 324.
160 id.
161 Id. at 326 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 327-28.
163 Id. at 329-31.
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E. The Supreme Court's Denial of Certiorari
It is rare for the Supreme Court to issue an opinion when it grants or denies
certiorari; usually, it is only reserved for important cases."6 When the Court denied
certiorari for Mellen, Justice Stevens wrote an opinion explaining the Court's
reasons for the denial. He was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice
Scalia dissented, and he was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. The Court dodged
the ultimate issue - the constitutionality of VMI's supper prayer - on a procedural
ruling, much as it had done in the Pledge of Allegiance case.
65
Justice Stevens explained that the Court denied certiorari because it lacked
jurisdiction, since there no longer was a "live controversy" between the super-
intendent and the cadets "regarding the constitutionality of the prayer' ' 166 and
because there was "no injunction presently barring VMI from reinstating the supper
prayer."' 67 He went on to state that "none of the parties has a present stake in the
outcome"'168 due to the plaintiffs' graduation and General Bunting's retirement;
indeed, "VMI itself is not a party" to the suit. 9
Justice Scalia, in an impassioned dissent, argued that the Court needed to grant
certiorari and resolve the dispute. He wrote:
The weighty questions raised by petitioners - about the proper
application of Lee where adults rather than children are the
subjects, and about the constitutionality of traditional religious
observance in military institutions - deserve this Court's atten-
tion, particularly since the decisions of two other Circuits are in
apparent contradiction as to whether Lee can extend so far. 70
Justice Scalia dissented for three reasons. First, he was concerned with Justice
Stevens's apparent desire to repudiate the Court's Saucier procedure. 7' Second,
" "[E]xcept when [J]ustices want to record strong opposition to the denial of cert ...
dissents are now rarely published." DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN PoLrrIcs 210 (6th ed. 2003). For a general discussion of the certiorari
process, see id. at 190-233.
'65 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
'66 Mellen, 124 S. Ct. at 1751.
167 Id. at 1752.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 1753 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (holding that before a court may determine
whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, it must first consider whether
the official's actions violated a constitutional right). Here, Scalia asserted that the Court must
first determine the constitutional issue before dismissing the case, in order "to clarify the law
and thus make unavailable repeated claims of qualified immunity in future cases." Mellen,
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Scalia refuted Stevens's assertion that the Court lacked jurisdiction, writing u..t
a court may always determine whether it holds jurisdiction, which is "the precise
issue [Scalia] would consider on certiorari."'72 Finally, Scalia challenged Stevens's
conclusion that the Fourth Circuit's ruling is distinguishable from the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits' rulings. 7 3 He wrote:
[T]he basis for the distinguishing - that this was a supper
prayer at a state military college, whereas the other cases in-
volved graduation prayers at state nonmilitary colleges - is, to
put it mildly, a frail one. (In fact, it might be said that the former
is more, rather than less, likely to be constitutional, since group
prayer before military mess is more traditional than group prayer
at ordinary state colleges.)' 74
Justice Scalia concluded, "VMI has previously seen another of its traditions
abolished by this Court. This time, however, its cause has been ignored rather than
rejected - though the consequence will be just the same."' 7'
Justice Stevens, responding to the dissent's critique, wrote:
Justice Scalia is quite wrong, however, when he states that the
"procedural tangle" created by our constitutional-question-first
procedure explains our denial of certiorari in this case. Indeed,
it is only one of three reasons for not granting review. The other
two are, first, that we have no jurisdiction, and second, that the
alleged conflict of authority is more apparent than real.
176
124 S. Ct. at 1754. Justice Scalia concluded:
In sum, we have before us in this petition a constitutional issue
of considerable consequence on which the Courts of Appeals are in
disagreement. The only apparent obstacle to our review is in fact an
additional incentive to our review, so that we might eliminate the
confusion spawned by our civil-rights constitutional-issue-first
jurisprudence.
Id. at 1755 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
172 Mellen, 124 S. Ct. at 1756 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173 id.
174 id.
175 Id. at 1755 (citation omitted).
176 Id. at 1751. Because there is no longer a "live controversy" between Mellen and
Bunting, Stevens concluded that the Court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality
of the supper prayer. Additionally, Stevens concluded that the circuit split - between the
Fourth Circuit's ruling that VMI's prayer was unconstitutional and the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits' rulings that similar prayer at colleges were constitutional - could be distinguished,
and thus did not require Supreme Court resolution. Id. at 1751-52.
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itH. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Concerning the Establishment Clause Generally
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and the Lemon test
in particular, has been extensively criticized both from within the Court itself and by
academics. Professor McCarthy writes: "Some commentators and Justices have
voiced their frustration... by referring to it as 'chaotic,' 'doctrinal gridlock,' a 'legal
quagmire,' contradictory and unprincipled, 'ad hoc,' 'intuitive,' and a 'maze.
'''177
Professor Paulsen argues that Lemon itself is dead. 7 8 According to Ashley Bell:
"When questioning the Supreme Court's modem Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, critics consistently return to one theme - its lack of consistency.' ' 79 Perhaps
most harshly, Professors Jeffries and Ryan write: "In terms of the conventional sources
of 'legitimacy' in constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause decisions are at least very venturesome, if not completely rootless."'",, Still,
some cling to a hope that the Court can rise above its fact-specific, ad hoc decisions:
The Establishment Clause is emblematic of this harmonizing
endeavor as it seeks to ensure both the autonomy of religion from
governmental interference and that a person's religious beliefs
(or lack thereof) will in no way affect his full inclusion within
the political community. . . . Perceived in this light, the
Establishment Clause possesses the potential to safeguard our
pluralistic society by enshrining both freedom of conscience in
religious matters as an inviolable constitutional right and re-
ligious tolerance as an indispensable constitutional imperative.' 8 '
'" Martha McCarthy, Religion and Education: Whither the Establishment Clause?, 75
IND. L.J. 123, 124 (2000) (citations omitted).
178 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795,800-13 (1993)
(criticizing Lemon as lacking doctrinal coherence and arguing that it no longer commands
a majority of the Court). Paulsen includes a list of significant cases in which individual
Justices have voiced their dissatisfaction with the Lemon test. Id. at 813-19. But see Daniel
0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 865 (1993) (responding to Professor
Paulsen's article and arguing that the converse is true).
'79 Bell, supra note 126, at 1274. Bell calls the Court's line-drawing "arbitrary." Id. at
1304.
180 John C. Jeffries & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 281 (2001).
181 Charles Gregory Warren, Comment, No Need to Stand on Ceremony: The Corruptive
Influence of Ceremonial Deism and the Need for a Separationist Reconfiguration of the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1669, 1670
(2003) (citations omitted).
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Amidst the criticism are some constructive suggestions for how the Court can climb
out of the Establishment Clause hole into which it has dug itself over the years.
Supreme Court opinions tend to look at history in order to justify the inter-
pretation and reasoning of the Court's decisions.182 However, in the Establishment
Clause cases, any thorough historical analysis is curiously lacking, or even more
distorted than usual, by the Court. Of course, for the Court to announce that the
original intent of the Founders was strictly separationist, they must necessarily
ignore history. For not only was religion inextricably linked with most state gov-
ernments at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and beyond,'8 3 but one of
the prominent sources of strict separation was a byproduct of religion itself in
public schools.
184
Any understanding of the Court's religion jurisprudence must be understood in
the context of the social and political forces surrounding its decisions. While not
entirely without legal foundation, the decisions are undeniably affected by the
changing composition of America's citizens. As the country became more plural-
istic and dominated less by mainstream Protestantism, America as a society, and
the Court in particular, was forced to reevaluate our understanding of religious
expression and religious freedom.
Disputes concerning the Establishment Clause have primarily arisen out of two
situations: the funding of religious (almost strictly Catholic) schools, and prayer
in public schools.185 The former situation was born of nativist bigotry; the majority
of America at the advent of "common schools" (the precursor of what were to
182 See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112
YALE L.J. 1717 (2003) (analyzing the roles of the Constitution's text, its original under-
standings, and its history in constitutional interpretation).
183 At the time the First Amendment was adopted, "[w]ith the barely arguable exception
of Rhode Island, no American state could have been found in compliance with the modem
understanding of separation of church and state." Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 180, at 292.
Indeed, seven of the fourteen states maintained government-sponsored churches, and several
others sought to advance Christianity in other ways. Id. McCarthy also writes that "support
for the notion of keeping civil and sectarian affairs discrete was by no means universal at the
time the Constitution was adopted.... But given the sketchy record of deliberations when
the amendment was written and adopted, the original intent cannot be delineated with
certainty." McCarthy, supra note 177, at 123 (citation omitted). White remarks that
immediately after adopting the Bill of Rights, the Framers "prayed when it was done." John
D. White, Casenote, Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1997), 39 S. TEX. L. REv. 165,
166 (1997).
184 See infra notes 185-99 and accompanying text.
185 See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 180, at 281 ("These two propositions - that public
aid should not go to religious schools and that public schools should not be religious - make
up the separationist portion of the modem Establishment Clause.").
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become public schools) was Protestant. 6 During that same period, America
experienced a marked and rapid increase of Catholic immigrants.'87 Because the
latter situation - school prayer - was an essential part of early public education,
and because school prayer was strictly Protestant, Catholic immigrants opened their
own schools. 8 ' In their article, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
Jeffries and Ryan note: "For most of its history, public education in America had
been unabashedly patriotic and unmistakenly Protestant.... Early common schools
featured Bible reading, prayer, hymns, and holiday observances, all reinforced by
the exhortations of the teacher and the pervasive Protestantism of the texts. 189
Because Catholics had essentially been forced out, and in some cases literally beaten
out, of the Protestant "public" schools, they struggled to get the government to fund
their schools.'90 Because the Protestants were terrified of a Pope-controlled Catholic
immigrant population overthrowing their Protestant-dominated government, they
viciously opposed any funding of Catholic schools.' 9' Jeffries and Ryan argue: "The
real origins of the modem Establishment Clause lay not so much (or at least not
only) in the utterances of Madison and Jefferson but in the political experiences and
values [in mid-twentieth century America] that made aid to religious schools so
problematic."' 92 Therefore, when the Court opened the door and ventured into the
arena of the Establishment Clause within public schools, it did so removed from the
moorings of both the original understanding of the First Amendment and the
particular historical development of that understanding. However, its language did
not reflect that disconnect.
93
,86 Id. at 297-99.
187 Id. at 299-300. Less than one percent of Americans were Catholic when the United
States was founded. In the one hundred years between 1830 and 1930, the number of
Catholics in the U.S. swelled from 600,000 to 24,000,000. In those last thirty years alone,
1900-1930, the number doubled. Id. at 300.
188 Id. ("If the public schools were Protestant, the Catholics wanted their own schools, and
for that, they needed money.").
189 Id. at 297-98.
190 Id. at 300. "In Maine and Massachusetts, Catholic students suffered beatings or expul-
sions for refusing to read from the Protestant Bible, and crowds in Philadelphia rioted over
whether Catholic children could be released from the classroom during Bible reading." Id.
'9' In a recent case upholding a government program that provided computers and other
instructional materials to parochial schools, Justice Thomas, writing the plurality opinion,
discussed the "shameful pedigree" of the label "pervasively sectarian," noting that it has
historically been used as a codeword for "Catholic." Justice Thomas went on to state that the
doctrine was "bom of bigotry." Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000).
192 Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 180, at 297.
193 Jeffries and Ryan note:
Indeed, many accounts of the history of the Establishment Clause take
a direct flight from James Madison to the present, with perhaps a brief
detour to buzz the airport of Reconstruction .... Neither the Bill of
Rights nor the Fourteenth Amendment had much to do with the
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In Everson, where the Court began its Establishment Clause project, the Court
"embraced ... that the Establishment Clause mandated a substantive policy of
separation of church and state... [and] that the policy condemned neutral support
of all religions as well as favoritism among them."' 94 Because of the heated dispute
between Protestants and Catholics, "the Everson opinions told Protestants that
hostility to parochial [Catholic] schools sprang not from sectarian rivalry or
narrow self-interest but from high principle."' 9' At the time, the various sects of
Protestantism were united against any government funding of parochial schools.
However, when the issue changed to prayer in school, the Protestant coalition began
to fracture. 96 In overturning prayer in school - beginning with the Engel case -
"[n]ot surprisingly (and not for the last time), the [Jiustices championed the
dominant views of the nation's elite as against popular opinion.' ' 9 While poli
ticians publicly championed the idea of school prayer, they did little to overturn the
Court's opinions. 9 8 Instead, the only proactive group in supporting school prayer
was conservative evangelicals.' 99
In a departure from their previous strict separation stance, the Court softened in
the 1990s.'0° In Mergens, the Court pronounced that "there is a crucial difference
between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
establishment of religion. The origins of the modem Establishment
Clause lay not in the late eighteenth century, but in the nineteenth and
twentieth. Accordingly, any attempt to understand where we are and
how we got here must focus on exactly those periods that conventional
history neglects.
. . . We think it plain that the separationist project begun in
Everson did not result from legal analysis. Neither the constitutional
text nor demonstrable original intent nor pre-existing doctrine or
precedent determined that decision.
Id. at 369.
' Id. at 291. The authors also note that the Court applied these policies to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, which they argue, unlike the incorporation of other
amendments to the states, is not a foregone conclusion. Id. at 294-96. For the purposes of
this Note, the author will assume that the Court has correctly incorporated the Establishment
Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment, and that Virginia, as the federal government, is
bound by the constraints laid out in the First Amendment.
'9' Id. at 315.
196 Id. at 319.
197 Id. at 326.
'9' Id. at 325.
199 Id.
200 See Roald Y. Mykkeltvedt, Souring on Lemon: The Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause Doctrine in Transition, 44 MERCER L. REv. 881 (1993) (arguing that the holding of
Mergens suggests that the Court's long-standing adherence to the strict separationist doctrine
in public schools is waning).
1027
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses protect."' ' In subsequent cases, "[p]rivate decisions to express
religious ideology in public schools have been upheld on the rationale that such
expression does not represent the government, and the circumstances under which
religious expression is considered 'private' are expanding."2 °2 McCarthy writes:
"The federal judiciary appears to be on a course of expanding the reach of the
nondiscrimination model and reducing the perceived governmental role associated
with devotional activities in public schools and the use of public funds in religious
schools."2 3 McCarthy further argues that these "small inroads" could perhaps end
with religious establishments in education.0 4 This fear, however, seems to be over-
blown. Certainly, allowing moments of silence, with clearly no intent to establish
a formalized prayer, or refusing prospectively to prohibit individuals or groups of
individuals from praying on government property, is a far cry from either a state
religion or even formalized school prayer.
Some commentators have proposed, as an alternative to the Supreme Court's
approach, a "practical nonpreferential" approach.2 5 In his article, Kevin Evans
argues that the Framers "intended to prevent the creation of a national church and
the federal preference of one or more religious sects over others; there was no intent
to prohibit the encouragement or furtherance by the federal government of religion
by nonpreferentialist means. 20 6 Practical preferentialism involves a two-step test.
207
"The first consideration would be whether the challenged action is nonpreferential
on its face .... The second consideration would be whether all religions necessarily
can be treated similarly., 20 8 Bell finds practical preferentialism lacking and suggests
combining it with the Marsh analysis: "Marsh recognized that the Lemon analysis
fails to take into account history and demonstrated the Court's willingness to forego
Lemon, even if it resulted in the development of the secularization approach."2"
Seeking an area for compromise, G. Sidney Buchanan suggests that
Establishment Clause cases can be better resolved by simply asking three questions:
201 Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
202 McCarthy, supra note 177, at 163-64.
203 Id. at 165.
204 Id. at 165-66.
205 Bell, supra note 126, at 1309; see also Kevin D. Evans, Beyond Neutralism: A
Suggested Historically Justifiable Approach to Establishment Clause Analysis, 64 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 41, 98-103 (1989).
206 Evans, supra note 205, at 99 (footnotes omitted). Given the practices in place at the
time of the adoption of the First Amendment, and the lack of legislative history surrounding
its adoption, that explanation is as likely as that advanced by those who point to Jefferson's
"wall of separation" comment.
207 Id. at 99-100.
208 id.
209 Bell, supra note 126, at 1311 (citations omitted).
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"First, who is the establisher? Second, what is being established? Finally, at winii
level of government is the establishment occurring? '210 Conceding, as the Supreme
Court has, that we are "a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being, ' 21' Buchanan argues that "the question of prayer in governmental institutions
cannot be resolved in an absolutist way.... Accordingly, a careful balancing of
competing values is required to achieve a workable resolution of the [three]
questions confronted in this article.,
212
B. The First Amendment as Applied to VMI
There is an atmosphere of "coercion" in some aspects of a VMI cadet's life. But
it is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit was in a position to determine that the cadets
felt coerced by the supper prayer.213 It was relatively simple for the Supreme Court
to do so in its school prayer cases, because in each of those situations the students
were minors, and therefore presumptively more susceptible to coercion. Here, VMI
is admittedly different from all but six other colleges in the United States. 214 Still,
it is doubtful that VMI cadets, or any of the students at America's other military
colleges, are any less capable than students at Indiana University or Tennessee State
University of realizing that they can ignore the supper prayer if they do not agree
with its content or the act of praying itself. Not only is it a conclusion solely based
on the judge's intuition that such an atmosphere must be per se coercive, even to an
18- or 19-year-old college student who has been admitted to a highly selective
college, with no specific factual support in the record, but also it is highly offensive
to those cadets who are capable of making such a distinction without the pater-
nalistic intervention of the courts.2
15
20 G. Sidney Buchanan, Prayer in Governmental Institutions: The Who, the What, and
the At Which Level, 74 TEMP. L.REv. 299, 299 (2001).
2. Id. at 354 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)) (internal quotations
omitted).
212 Id. at 354.
213 In fact, the plaintiff cadets did not plead as much in their complaint. See Wilkinson,
supra note 5 (Plaintiffs "conceded that they faced no adverse consequences for any failure
to take part in the prayer, and they did not even claim that they felt pressure to attend or par-
ticipate in the observance, apart from the basic requirement to stand."). At the least, there is
some factual dispute whether cadets feel coerced, see Kahn, supra note 72, and a legal find-
ing of coercion, without definitive factual support in the record, is necessarily a subjective
determination by the judge, and therefore less favorable as an element to any test. Not only
does it fail to provide any prospective guidance to educators, it also allows one judge (or a
panel of judges) to make normative judgments with little or no factual or legal foundation.
214 The United States Naval Academy, the United States Military Academy at West Point,
the United States Air Force Academy, the Citadel, the Coast Guard Academy, and the United
States Merchant Marine Academy are all similar military colleges.
215 Of course, the danger of the opposite logic - as applied in Marsh and other cases -
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Such formalistic exercises of school prayer should be prevented in public
institutions of higher learning as they are in elementary and secondary schools, but
not for any reason put forth by the Fourth Circuit. No court, particularly in factual
situations involving non-minors, should have to wade into the subjective quagmire
of determining whether the saying of a prayer "coerces" the audience. Whether a
particular exercise is properly characterized as a "prayer" has never been at issue in
any of these cases. Even in those cases in which the prayer is ultimately allowed,
courts have done so with the full acknowledgment that the act was indeed a
prayer.2 16 Therefore, the only test should be: (1) is it a prayer, and if so, (2) is it a
government-sponsored event or a government actor? If yes, then the act should be
held unconstitutional. Prayers that tend to pass the current Supreme Court juris-
prudence are so watered down in content that they have virtually lost any meaning,
and should thus be undesirable even to those who wish to reintroduce prayer into
schools or other government-sponsored settings.
Some may argue that this proposed test would go too far. The First Amendment
does include two clauses pertaining to religion: the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause. Many argue that by being strictly separationist, as it was for
many years, the Court would be going beyond the antiestablishment of religion and
infringing on the student's free exercise rights. Yet, which free exercise rights are
VMI cadets enjoying by listening to a prayer written and read by another person?
If we were to accept the benefits of the prayer, even communal prayer, how does an
institutionalized process further that purpose, particularly when it is mandatory, in
a way that promotes a student's free exercise rights? As non-minors, the cadets' free
exercise rights are at issue.
At VML, coercion and conformity rub in the opposite direction, too. If the
cadets pray prior to supper, even if that practice does not violate the Constitution in
terms of the Establishment Clause, it violates the Free Exercise Clause in terms of
the cadets' freedom to pray. It is not the individual cadets exercising their freedom;
rather, it is the Institute that is praying for them. Therefore, analyzing prayer at
public institutions of higher learning demands a new paradigm.
is the reliance on history and tradition to justify these practices, and to conclude that they are
virtually harmless given their history and tradition.
Although the Court was trying to preserve history and tradition, "it
would, no doubt, come as a surprise to those who offer legislative
prayers that their efforts are constitutional only because the Court
construes their words to be the functional equivalent of the gavel used
to bang a meeting to order."
Bell, supra note 126, at 1306 (quoting Timothy L. Hall, Sacred Solemnity: Civic Prayer,
Civil Communion, and the Establishment Clause, 79 IOWA L. REv. 35, 63 (1993)).
216 See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding a state legislature's
practice of opening sessions with a prayer).
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C. Proposed Remedy
The appropriate remedy to this situation, if we as a society are uncomfortable
completely removing prayer from all situations, is to allow a moment of silence
instead. Some commentators have argued that this is actually letting school prayer
in through the "back door., 217 However, (1) the Fourth Circuit has recently upheld
Virginia's "minute-of-silence" statute; (2) with non-minors, coercion is no longer
a concern; and (3) a moment of silence would not infringe on a cadet's free exercise
(or non-exercise) of her religion.
In upholding Virginia's minute-of-silence statute, the Fourth Circuit noted that,
as written, the statute had "at least two purposes, one of which is clearly secular and
one of which may be secular even though it addresses religion."'2 18 It continued: "To
the extent that the minute of silence is designed to permit nonreligous meditation,
it clearly has a nonreligious purpose. And to the extent it is designed to permit
students to pray, it accommodates religion."2"9 In other words, it protects students
from being unwillingly exposed to religious prayer, while at the same time, allowing
students who wish to exercise their freedom to pray the ability to do so. The court
went on to hold that there was no excessive entanglement between the government
and religion.22 0 The statute limits the involvement of the teacher (in Establishment
Clause cases, the agent of the government) to informing the students of their options
during the minute of silence, options that are facially secular. The government's
"involvement in religion is negligible, left only to informing students that one of the
permissible options during the moment of silence is prayer." '' Nor did the state
endorse religion, because there was "simply no evidence to indicate that Virginia
has promoted any religion or promoted religion over nonreligion. 222
Mellen will not be the case that reaches the Supreme Court. There are
admittedly few situations in which prayer arises in a controversial setting at a
college or university. Moreover, the factual situation involved in Mellen is
217 See Debbie Kaminer, Bringing Organized Prayer in Through the Back Door: How
Moment-of-Silence Legislation for the Public Schools Violates the Establishment Clause, 13
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 267 (2002); see also id. at 322 (explaining that moment-of-silence
legislation violates the Establishment Clause because it amounts to the government telling
"schoolchildren how or when they should pray"). But see Linda D. Lam, Note, Silence of the
Lambs: Are States Attempting To Establish Religion in Public Schools?, 56 VAND. L. REV.
911, 937 (2003) (arguing that moment-of-silence statutes do not violate the Establishment
Clause, but instead, "when written and applied in a neutral fashion, provide a compromise
between those who desire a complete separation of government and religion and those who
do not").
2' Brown, 258 F.3d at 276.
219 id.
220 Id. at 278.
221 Id.
222 Id.
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decidedly unique. But the area seems to be in flux. Commentators and Supreme
Court Justices alike have been declaring the Lemon test dead for years. It is possible
that the Court will decide to clarify the matter, particularly since there is no guiding
precedent for prayer involving non-minors. The companion case to the school
prayer area is Newdow, which could affect the status of ceremonial deism. If the
Court decides to strike down the pledge of allegiance on religious, rather than
coercion, grounds, the result could affect the ability of courts to argue subsequently
that such things as university invocations and benedictions are harmless.
It is difficult to accept that the distinction between allowing prayer to open a
legislative session while not allowing it at a college event is merely that legislatures
have done it longer. Alleged history and tradition should not be allowed to trump
constitutional rights. The Third Circuit has announced that "impermissible practice
can not be transformed into a constitutionally acceptable one by putting a
democratic process to an improper use. 22 3 Why then can the Court, a notably
undemocratic institution, decide that an otherwise impermissible practice can be
transformed into a constitutionally acceptable one simply by putting the mark of
history and tradition on it?
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit correctly upheld the district court's decision that held
VMI's supper prayer as unconstitutional. However, the Fourth Circuit should
have better justified the result, instead of relying on the tenuous logic that VMI is
"different" because it is a military school. It is demeaning to the cadets of VMI
to say that they were subjected to a constitutionally impermissible establishment
of religion because the nature of their education makes them "impressionable."
Are VMI's cadets, many of whom go on to have successful careers largely outside
of the military, that much different from Nebraska's legislators, or even from
their peers at the University of Virginia? Were UVA students subjected to a
prayer situation - whether similar to VMI's or Indiana University's - would that
still be unconstitutional?
The reasoning of both courts in all three decisions, along with that of the
dissenters, shows the convoluted nature of the Supreme Court's school prayer
jurisprudence. When removed from the context of school prayer at elementary and
secondary schools, it provides little or no guidance to lower courts. There must be
more substance to the jurisprudence in this area when applied to adults. Fact-
specific cases demand contextual analysis and flexibility. Unfortunately, that ap-
proach also leads to confusion. The Supreme Court has repeatedly muddied the
school prayer waters with numerous decisions involving numerous lines of rea-
223 ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 (3rd Cir. 1996).
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soning.224 For that reason, the Supreme Court should not have denied certiorari and
passed on an opportunity to affirm the result and clarify the rationale for the law.
The issue of religion is certainly not one that will soon recede, so this area of
Supreme Court law begs for, and deserves, a more consistent and honest approach
than it has to date. Most important, it is an issue that demands some sort of
compromise and balance between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause. Without a compromise, no court will enjoy the support of the citizenry.
America is a country that is, and has been for quite some time, undergoing
remarkable changes in the religious composition of her citizens. In order to protect
all of them in their varied beliefs and disbeliefs - from any infringement on their
freedom from government-supported religion and their freedom to practice their
own religion - the courts must be vigilant at both ends of the spectrum. That
vigilance would be better served by consistent legal guidance on what is and what
is not constitutional. In the area of school prayer at an institution of higher learning,
a moment-of-silence would be a policy that would protect the entire spectrum.
The Fourth Circuit should have decided the case better - not differently - by
not relying on the tenuous and faulty military school logic. The Supreme Court
should not have passed on the opportunity to affirm the result and clarify the
rationale for the law.
224 See supra Part I.
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